7: Thompson--367-368 J-4 (no date) 1937 Laotians
116, 175, 726, 728

"The fuse which set off the accumulating grievances against Siam was the suicide of the French consul at Luang-Prabang, worn out by his struggles with the Siamese. His death shocked the Chamber of Deputies into voting unanimously for action, which had also the Commercial Syndicate's backing and Pavie's documentation on which to act. The military campaign which followed in 1893 drove all the Siamese from the east bank of the Mekong, from Cambodia to Khemmaret. These operations against Siam centred around three points, but the most important was the naval demonstration at Pak Nam. A treaty was subsequently concluded on the basis of the ultimatum which called [368] for evacuation of the Mekong's left bank and indemnity for Siamese aggression. Siam found to her sorrow that too much faith had been placed in English backing and France's indifference and preoccupation with Tonkin. If in carrying out the evacuation clause Siam forced wholesale deportations of the Laotians to her territory it was the final manifestation of her drang nach Osten."

68: Mouhot--85-86 N-5 (1858-61) 1864 Laotians
116, 131, 728, 631, 162, 177.63 Siam
636.63

"A great number of the inhabitants of this province [HD: i.e. Saraburi, in Siam] are natives of Laos, and are principally captives brought from Vien Chang after the insurrection there. The provinces of Boatioume and Petchaboune are peopled by Siamese, for Laos proper only commences at M'L6m. Boatioume, Petchaboune, Sôm, and some other provinces in the north and east, are governed by Siamese mandarins of rank more or less elevated; that is to say, several of them have the power of life and death, and are [86]then considered as viceroys. The most distant provinces belong to the empire of Siam, and form a part of it."

648* These perpetual struggles tired out the people of Lan-Xang, even
175* though this last campaign against Ayuthya might be justified as a
643* diversionary operation designed to disengage Cambodia (1).

1. The first pillage of Angkor by the Siamese occurred in 1357.

175* The death of Queen Nang-Yot-Keo in 1368, who exerted a power-
643* ful influence for good over Fa-Ngoun, marked the beginning of a new period of multiple excesses. The king's comrades in arms oppressed the people without any restraint, while Fa-Ngoun let things take their course, finding repose from his expeditions in unchecked pleasure and not respecting any woman among his subjects, not even his ministers' wives. In the end the latter could no longer endure him, and under the pressure of general discontent dared to depose him in 1373 and exile him to Muong-Nan, where he died in the following year at the age of fifty-eight.

Fa-Ngoun was the warrior king par excellence, always under arms. Without fear, if not /51/ without reproach, and imagining himself invulnerable after so many victories, he subjected by force or solely by his reputation all that was not Annamite or Cambodian in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. This great prince was the true founder of "Lan-Xang" unity He was a curious and paradoxical figure, and quite unexpected in the history of a people who were partial to order and tranquillity, whose pseudo-feudal regime was highly paternalistic, and who from this time on were to manifest characteristics of gentleness, nonchalance and gaiety which left them without resources against adversity.

648* SAM-SÈNE-THAÏ (OUN-HUEUN) (1356), KING 1373-1416.
643*

728 To the king of war succeeded the monarch of peace.

175* Oun-Hueun, the son of Phaya-Fa Ngoun, was seventeen years old when his father was deposed. He mounted the throne upon the departure of the exile and married Nang-Keo-Yopha, who had been promised to Fa-Ngoun as a hostage by the king of Ayuthya. He intervened peacefully in the affairs of Tran-Ninh in order to enthrone the son and then the grandson of Kham-Gno, to whom he returned the two wives who had been detained in Xieng-Thong ever since the last /52/ campaign of his father. He came out of a Burmese attack

victorious (1), and this expedition, which would seem to have 648*
643*

1. With the help of Trân-Ninh. 728
175*

been imposed on him, is the only campaign which is related during his long forty-three year reign.

According to the Annals he strictly observed the Buddhist teaching and followed, in a more docile manner than his father had done, the pious counsels of Pha-Maha-Pasaman-Thala-Tiao, his spiritual director, "and so his kingdom knew a long period of peace and prosperity." He was a great builder of temples, and erected the pagodas of Manorom, Ouposot (with a library which was given the manuscripts which had been brought from Angkor), and Xieng-Kang which was built in memory of his daughter, the young princess Sivayaka, who died of smallpox at the age of twelve. 643* 175* /645 792/

The Three Hundred Thousand Thais. In 1376 he gave orders for a general census of the inhabitants of Lang-Xang. The results gave 300,000 "registered" Thais, not counting women, children, bonzes, foreigners, slaves and Khas (2), and Oun-Hueun took /53/ 161 175* 654

2. The number of registered non-Thais was about 400,000.

/C.A.M. Translator's note. Page 53 is devoted to a map: "Lan-Xang and surrounding regions at the death of Fa-Ngoun (1374)". /

as his reigning name Phaya-Sam-Sène-Thai, the King of the Three Hundred Thousand Thais.

Social Organization. These folk then constituted a society grouped by families and divided into Nobles and Commoners. The Nobles were given certain privileges and helped to administer the kingdom, from the dignitaries who were princes of royal blood down to the simple officials who were responsible for collecting taxes, for assembling labor drafts, for transporting goods, etc. 631 565 175*

In the provinces the heads of circumscriptions (Muongs) were elected either from the Nobles or from the Commoners, but the choice of the electors generally fell on the son or some relative of the person who was to be replaced, unless there were some unworthiness or notorious incapability.

When he returned to his States, Setthathirath endeavored to win over permanently to his cause the chieftains of Lakhone, Xieng-Khong, Xieng-Hai, /80/ Muong-Pray and Muong-Nan who had not supported Bureng-Naung, and when he was sure of their support he advanced as far as Xieng-Sen. But there he soon learned that the governor of Xieng-Hai had been taken prisoner by the Burmese and that his sister Nang-Kalay had been treacherously abducted. In spite of his anger, he judged it prudent to withdraw in the company of his allies, who left their governments in the hands of Bureng-Naung's lieutenants. 726 643* 648* 175*

Treaty of alliance with Ayuthya (1560). In order to oppose the common danger, he took the first steps towards reconciliation with the king of Ayuthya, to whom he proposed a treaty of alliance. The Siamese, who were rebuilding the ruins of their capital with courage but not without disquietude, joyfully accepted and their prince gave one of his daughters to Setthathirath. A frontier pyramid was built on the watershed between the basin of the Mekong and that of the river of Nan which flows down to the Menam. Solemnly surrounded by their courts, the two kings swore reciprocal friendship and assistance: "May the ties that bind us be prolonged from father to son down to our grandchildren and great-grandchildren; may quarrels be unknown between us and peace continue to reign /An unpaged photograph is inserted between pp. 80 and 81: "The That-Luong at Vientiane."--Translator/ /81/ until the day when the sun and the moon fall to the surface of the earth" (1). 728 643* 648* 175*

1. Cf. Lefevre-Pontalis, La lutte des Thaïs contre les Birmans au seizieme siecle.

Vientiane, capital of Lan-Xang (1563). In order to avoid any surprise by the common enemy as well as to maintain the connection with Ayuthya, Setthathirath left Luang-Prabang permanently and transferred the capital of Lan-Xang to Vientiane. 643* 648* 175*

He was the true founder of this city which owes to him the splendor with which it shone during all of the seventeenth century and part of the eighteenth. He first surrounded it with solid bastion fortifications (2), then in the center near the river built the 633 643* 175* 172

2. From the vestiges which still remained around 1900 before the canal was dug and the circular boulevard laid out, /712/

648* attitude, which was by turns hostile and benevolent with
175* respect to Nguyen-Anh, was less incoherent than might be supposed. Inspired by the evident desire to play the role of arbiter in Annam's affairs, it would react in accordance with circumstances. Thus after having taken umbrage at the foreign aid which the prince received after 1788, the court of Bangkok later sent him sizeable reinforcements whose ranks were swelled by Laotian mountaineers (Cf. ibid., p. 114) and who came to take part in the siege of Qui-Nhon (1801).

When the Tay-Son had been defeated and Nguyen-Anh, under the name of Gia-Long, had become the leader of a powerful empire united under his authority, he had responded in 1810 to the appeal by Cambodia when it was again invaded by Siam. He had sent troops before whom the Siamese had withdrawn without fighting, /728/ and by the treaty of Ba-Lich had established a kind of protectorate over the kingdom (1813).

/209/ His successor Minh-Manh had encountered Siam in the violent insurrection of Khoi in Cochinchina (1832). After "extinguishing it in blood" he had attacked Anou's vanquisher, the old general Bodin, who had profited by the circumstances in order to dispossess the Cambodian king Neac-Ang-Chan. He had forced him to beat a retreat (1835) and in the following year when Ang-Chan died the emperor of Annam had divided Cambodia into thirty-three provinces which were linked administratively with Cochinchina. As was his wont, Bodin had devastated and depopulated the land as he left.

SOUKA-SEUM, KING OF LUANG-PRABANG 1798. KING 1836-1850.

175* Things had gone thus far when Mantha-Thourath, king of Luang-Prabang, died. His eldest son Souka-Seum whom he had chosen to succeed him had been residing in Bangkok for some ten years (1).

1. See above, p. 202.

He was held there as a hostage and did not receive the investiture from Siam until 1839.

What took place in the principality during his absence? We do not know, and no chronicle /210/ has so far confirmed Schreiner's astounding account of a prince of Luang-Prabang who, while Tonkin

579 ravaging the region of Dien-Bien-/246/ Phu as far as Muong-Ngoi.
563 King Oun-Kham was growing old and carefree and felt incapable,
727 when left entirely to his own resources, of calming the mortal dis-
175* quietude of his people. Thus Siamese agents, the number of whom
/648/* was constantly on the increase, were welcomed all along the Upper Mekong as the only protectors from whom effective aid could be expected.

636 Relations with the cantons of the Black River. The man Cam-
175* Sinh, who was of Chinese origin himself, was nevertheless a friend of the princes of Luang-Prabang, but he was then too preoccupied with driving the invaders out of his own domains to lend any support to his neighbor.

His remote ancestors were military mandarins in Quang-Si and had settled three hundred years previously in Muong-Lai, which they had pacified in behalf of the king of Anna. Their authority extended around Lai-Chau as far as Yunnan in the north and Muong Theng in the south (Dien-Bien-Phu, the legendary cradle of the Laotian race). At this time they had reached a peaceful agreement
●/728/ with the kings of Lan-Xang, most likely Nokeo-Koumane or Thammi-Karath who had just /247/ shaken off the Burmese yoke (1) and who

1. See above, pp. 97 and 100.

were glad to give them charge of the "white" and "black" Thais of the region in exchange for a triennial payment of thirty-three taels of silver "and one horse" (2). Relations had subsequently become

2. Cf. the Chronicle of Muong-Lai given by Deo-van-Tri to Auguste Pavie in 1894.

completely friendly and trusting to such a degree that when Cam-Sinh was in conflict with several of his relatives around 1850 he had not hesitated to place two of his children, one of whom was Deo-van-Tri, in Souka-Seum's hands (3).

3. See above, p. 213, note.

669 Revolt of the Khas of Muong-Ngoi (1876). It was not until 1876,
175* after he had temporarily driven back the Yellow Flags, that he was
563 able to send any reinforcements to Oun-Kham to sustain the struggle

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726 "Our seamen," as M. Flourens put it, "had cut their way through the barrages, the torpedos and the obstacles of all kinds which the Siamese Government had laid out in order to shield, behind a barrier which it believed insurmountable, the brazen despicableness of its incessant provocations."

175 The news aroused indignation as soo[illegible] it became known in France, and in its session of July 18 the Chamber authorized the
• 728 Foreign Minister to deliver the following ultimatum to the Siamese Governments

648 1. Recognition of French rights to the left bank of the Mékong and to its islands.

2. Evacuation of the Siamese outposts established on the left bank of the Mékong, within the space of one month.

3. Satisfaction for the aggressions committed.

4. Punishment of the guilty.

5. An indemnity of two millions for damages caused.

6. Deposit of the sum of three millions as security, or payment of the tax revenues from the provinces of Battambang and Siem-Reap (2).

(2) See Appendix IXa.

Siam refused at first to accept these conditions, and on July 22 offered to cede the left bank as far as the 18th patallel, thus wishing to keep Vien-Tiane, Luang-Prabang, Tran-Ninh, the Hua-Pahn, Muong-Poukha, Xieng-Khong, Muong-Sing, the two Muong-Hou and the Pahn-Na on the left bank. It was counting, and with some reason, on the support of Great Britain.

Lord Roseberry and Ed. Grey tried, but in vain, to arouse [26] opinion in London and to provoke diplomatic intervention. The Foreign Office refused categorically. Discouraged by this sudden abandonment and intimidated by the resolute attitude of the French Government (1), the king of Siam accepted the conditions which had

(1) In accordance with the Department's instructions, M. Pavie had struck his flag and left Bangkok on July 26 aboard the Inconstant.

been offered without further ado. M. Le Myre de Vilers was named Ambassador Extraordinary and arrived to conclude a treaty with the Court of Siam which should be based on the ultimatum. Signed on

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October 3, 1893, in Bangkok, it was ratified by the French parliament in January 1894.

The following are the clauses of the treaty (2):

(2) See Appendix X.

Treaty concluded in Bangkok on October 3, 1893, between the government of the French Republic and the government of His Majesty the king of Siam, in order to bring an end to the disputes which have arisen between the two lands and strengthen friendly relations.

The President of the French Republic and H.M. the king of Siam, wishing to bring an end to the disputes which have arisen in recent times between the two States and to strengthen the friendly relations which have existed between France and Siam for centuries past, have named as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the French Republic,

M. Charles Marie Le Myre de Vilers, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor and of the White Elephant, Minister plenipotentiary of the 1st class, deputy;

And H.M. the king of Siam, His Royal Highness Prince Devawongse Varoprakar, knight of the order of Maha Chakrkri, grand officer of the Legion of Honor, etc., minister of Foreign Affairs;

who, after communicating their full powers to one another and having recognized them as in good and due form, have agreed to the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The Siamese Government renounces all claim to all of the territories on the left bank of the Mékong and to the islands in this river.

ARTICLE 2. The Siamese Government agrees not to maintain or circulate ships or armed vessels on the waters of the Great Lake [Grand Lac], the Mékong or their tributaries within the limits specified in the following article.

ARTICLE 3. The Siamese Government shall not construct any fortified outpost or military establishment in the provinces of Battambang and Siem-Reap or within a radius of twenty-five kilometers from the right bank of the Mékong.

ARTICLE 4. In the zones specified in Article 3, police duty shall be carried out, according to [27] custom, by the local authorities with only such contingents as are strictly necessary. No regular or

648 irregular armed force shall be maintained there.

•728 ARTICLE 5. The Siamese Government agrees to open negotiations with the French Government, within a period of six months, with a view to drawing up regulations governing customs and trade in the territories specified in Article 3, and to revising the treaty of 1856. 175

Until such an agreement has been reached, no customs duties shall be established in the zone specified in Article 3. Reciprocity shall continue to be accorded by the French Government to the products of the aforesaid zone.

ARTICLE 6. Since the development of navigation along the Mékong may necessitate certain construction projects on the right bank, or the establishment of boat relays and depots for wood and coal, the Siamese Government agrees to provide, at the request of the French Government, all necessary facilities for this purpose.

ARTICLE 7. French citizens, subjects and nationals may circulate and engage in trade freely in the territories specified in Article 3, when provided with a pass issued by the French authorities. Reciprocity shall be accorded to the inhabitants of the aforesaid zones.

ARTICLE 8. The French Government reserves the right to establish consulates wherever it deems suitable in the interest of its nationals, and particularly at Korat and Muong-Nan.

ARTICLE 9. In case of any difficulties in interpretation, the French text alone shall be deemed valid.

ARTICLE 10. The present treaty must be ratified within a period of four months dating from the day of its signing.

In faith of which the below-named respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in duplicate and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at the palace of Vallabha, in Bangkok, October 3, 1893.

(Signed) Le Myre de Vilers
(Signed) Devawongse Varoprakar

An agreement of which the following is the text was joined to the preceding treaty:

149: Reinach--20 G-3 (no date) 1901 AM1 Indochina
Laotians AM8
Colonial

AGREEMENT

GH8
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The plenipotentiaries have determined, in the present agreement, the different measures and steps involved in carrying out the peace treaty signed this day, and the ultimatum accepted on last August 5.

ARTICLE 1. The last Siamese military posts on the left bank [28] of the Mékong shall be evacuated within the maximum space of one month dating from September 5.

ARTICLE 2. All fortifications in the zone specified in Article 3 of the treaty dated this day shall be razed.

ARTICLE 3. The authors of the attempts on Tong-Xieng-Kham and Kammoun shall be judged by the Siamese authorities. A representative of France shall be present at the judgment and shall see to it that the penalties pronounced are carried out.

The French Government reserves the right to judge whether the sentences are sufficient and, if need arise, to demand a new trial before a mixed tribunal whose composition it shall determine.

ARTICLE 4. The Siamese Government shall place at the disposition of the Minister of France in Bangkok or of the French frontier authorities all French, Annamite and Laotian subjects of the left bank and the Cambodians who are being detained on any grounds whatsoever. It shall in no way impede the return to the left bank of former inhabitants of this region.

ARTICLE 5. The Ban-Bien of Tong-Xieng-Kham and his retinue shall be brought to the French Legation by a delegate of the Foreign Minister, as well as the weapons and the French flag seized by the Siamese authorities.

ARTICLE 6. The French Government shall continue to occupy Chantaboun(1) until such time as the provisions of the present Agreement have been carried out, particularly the complete evacuation

(1) We are still there in 1901.

and pacification both of the left bank and the zones specified in Article 3 of the treaty dated this day.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

149; Reinach--21 G-3 (no date) 1901 AM1 Indochina
Laotians AM8
Colonial

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Done in duplicate at the palace of Vallabha, in Bangkok, October 3, 1893.

(Signed) Le Myre de Vilers.
(Signed) Devawongse Varoprakar.

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It became perfectly apparent, after the signing of the treaty and the additional agreement, that these two acts were nothing but palliatives. Only the out-and-out annexation of Siam, in addition to the fact that it would have greatly enlarged our colonial empire, would have enabled us to hold the British and the Germans, who were our commercial rivals, in check.

For a long time the Siamese had been saying, "The day when we are forced to evacuate we shall leave nothing but the land, the water and the wild beasts of the forests." And, as a matter of fact, [29] they had applied this maxim almost to the letter in 1827 and 1840 when, out of fear of Annamite reprisals on the left bank, they had forced people and livestock to follow them over to the right bank and all the way to the Ménam valley. This procedure was altogether too simple for them not to have had the idea of trying it again in 1893. Time was the only thing they lacked to carry out their sinister plan, but they left us only a depopulated and devastated land, keeping for themselves the Laos of the right bank and the rich provinces of Angkor and Battambang, that is to say the well-populated and fertile territories which had never suffered, as the present-day Laos, several invasions in less than a century.

The hesitancy of the court of Bangkok when the ultimatum was delivered, as well as its attempts to keep the territories of the left bank of the Mékong above the 18th parallel, were once more a clear indication of British interference. Although not apparent, British influence had never ceased to make itself felt in the course of all these negotiations. The goal of this hidden influence was to preserve British preponderance in the Pahn-Na and, since Britain was already master of the kingdom of Ava, to facilitate the achievement of its plans for a railway towards S'sémao and Yunnan-Sen.

It was nevertheless forced to come out into the open, and demanded that a neutral zone or sort of buffer state be established between the British and French territories along the Upper Mékong. It aimed at preventing us from occupying territory which had been